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Summary
Japan and North Korea have not established official relations since North Korea was
founded in 1948.  In 2000, the two countries held three rounds of normalization talks,
which had been frozen since 1992.  The talks, however, have been stalled since
November 2000.  One of Pyongyang’s key demands is that Tokyo compensate North
Korea for Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910-1945.  Though Japan
has resisted using terms such as “compensation” and “reparations,” Tokyo has offered
to provide North Korea with a large-scale economic aid package, much as it gave South
Korea economic assistance when Tokyo and Seoul normalized relations in 1965.  North
Korea, however, insists that it will only accept  “compensation.”  This disagreement over
terminology has contributed to the current deadlock in the normalization negotiations.
The 1965 Japan-South Korean settlement consisted of a $300 million grant, $200
million in low-interest long-term government loans, and $300 million in private credits
from Japanese financial institutions.  There are a number of estimates for the present
value of the 1965 Japan-South Korea settlement, ranging from as low as $3.4 billion to
over $20 billion.  One methodology that adjusts for inflation in Japan and for inter-
Korean population differences yields a 1999 value of approximately $3.8 billion.
Reportedly,  Japanese officials are discussing a package on the order of $5-$10 billion.
 This report will be updated periodically to track developments in the Japan-North
Korea normalization talks. 
Background
In the fall of 1999, William Perry, Special Advisor to the President on North Korea,
unveiled a new strategy for halting North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long-range missile
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programs.1  One of the “carrots” in the United States’ policy appears to be a prospective
large-scale economic assistance package, conditional upon North Korea’s cooperation.2
 It is widely believed that one of the largest source of economic aid to Pyongyang would
come from a prospective Japanese offer of monetary “compensation” for its colonization
of the Korean peninsula in the first half of the 20th Century.3  To this end, South Korea and
the Clinton Administration – the former under its so-called “sunshine policy” toward North
Korea – urged Japan to reduce tensions with North Korea.4  Tokyo and Pyongyang have
not established official relations since North Korea was founded in 1948. North Korea
insists that before it will establish relations with Tokyo, Japan must provide an apology and
monetary compensation to resolve Japan’s past treatment of Korea.5  Japan has agreed in
principle to offer an economic package to North Korea, but has been vague about its
amount, form, timing, and characterization.
In 2000, North Korea improved relations with all the major countries in Northeast
Asia, with the exception of Japan.   Most dramatically, South Korean President Kim Dae
Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held the first-ever inter-Korean summit meeting
in mid-June.  The two leaders pledged to take steps toward an eventual reunification,
including setting up economic cooperation projects between the two Koreas.  Two weeks
before the summit, Kim Jong-il traveled to Beijing, his first trip to China since the death
of his father and predecessor, Kim Il-Sung, in 1994.  Shortly after the summit, the U.S.
lifted most of its remaining economic sanctions on North Korea.   In July 2000, Russian
President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea, signaling a thaw in Moscow-Pyongyang
relations, which have been icy since the Soviet Union established relations with South
Korea in 1990.  These diplomatic moves by North Korea have placed even greater
pressures on Tokyo to improve relations with Pyongyang.
The Japan-North Korea Normalization Talks - Issues and
Chronology
Disagreements over the Economic Settlement Package.  Regarding the
size of Japan’s economic package to North Korea, official figures have not been released
by either side, though Pyongyang reportedly has demanded $10 billion at minimum. Some
Japanese experts believe that North Korea will ask for a settlement in the $20 billion range.
According to Japanese North Korea-watchers, no consensus has been reached in Tokyo
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on Japan’s bottom line, though there have been reports that Japanese officials are
discussing a package on the order of $5-$10 billion.  According to one report in the
Japanese press, Japanese officials in October 2000 were considering a $9 billion package.6
Observers suggest that Tokyo will argue that $2 billion be deducted from the final amount
in order to give Japan credit for its $1 billion contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) and the $1 billion North Korea owes Japanese
sources (mainly Japanese banks) from unpaid debts incurred in the 1970s and 1980s.7  
In addition to the size of the settlement, the two sides have clashed over terminology.
Japan is refusing North Korea’s demand that the package be labeled as “reparations,” or
even “compensation.”  Instead, Tokyo has offered to characterize the monies as “economic
assistance,” as it did in the 1965 Japan-South Korean normalization negotiations.8  This
semantic dispute has momentarily stalled the talks.  Other issues likely to be contentious
include the conditions placed on Pyongyang’s use of the aid/reparations, and the
composition of the money – grants or loans.9   Additionally, North Korea is demanding
that Japan issue a formal, “legally binding apology” from the Japanese emperor and/or
prime minister.  Japan has countered that a sufficient apology was extended as part of
1995 statement by then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama expressing regret for Japan’s
past actions. 
Other Contentious Issues.  Any normalization agreement will be politically
difficult for the Japanese government.  In recent years, relations with North Korea have
become a high-profile political issue in Japan, due to North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong
missile launch over Japan, its 1999 naval incursion into Japanese waters, and the release
of new (albeit unconfirmed) evidence that Pyongyang kidnapped Japanese citizens in the
1970s and 1980s.10  Public opinion polls indicate that most Japanese favor adopting a
cautious approach toward North Korea.11  Conservative groups in Japan – including many
members of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party – opposed the government’s decisions
in March and October 2000 to resume shipments of food aid to North Korea, arguing that
Japanese assistance should be conditioned on Pyongyang’s cooperation on the abduction
cases and on missile and nuclear weapons issues.12  An additional concern expressed by
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these groups is that Japanese compensation or food aid might be used for North Korea’s
military rather than for its populace.  During the April 2000 talks, the Japanese delegation
also raised the issues of North Korea’s alleged drug-trafficking, and its alleged biological
and chemical weapons programs.
The 9th Round (April 2000).  In the April 2000 Japan-North Korea talks, North
Korea insisted that relations be normalized only after completing a “settlement of the
past,” a phrase Pyongyang defines to include four items:  an apology, compensation, the
return of cultural assets taken from Korea during the occupation, and the granting of legal
status to ethnic Koreans living in Japan.  For future negotiating rounds, North Korea
proposed establishing panels to deal with other outstanding issues, including Pyongyang’s
missile development program and the whereabouts of ten Japanese allegedly kidnapped by
North Korean agents.  Japan, seeking to avoid decoupling the compensation/apology issue
from the kidnaping and missile disputes, rejected the North Korean proposal. 
The 10th Round (August 2000).  On July 26, 2000, the Japanese and North
Korean Foreign Minister staged an unprecedented meeting at the ASEAN Regional Forum
meeting in Bangkok.  The two officials agreed to hold another round of talks in Tokyo in
August.  They also agreed to resume discussions over further visitations to Japan by
women who married Korean husbands and emigrated to North Korea.  
At the August 21-24, 2000 bilateral meetings in Japan for the first time formally 
raised the possibility of providing an economic assistance package – i.e. not a
compensation payment – to North Korea.  Reportedly, no figures were discussed, and
North Korea did not respond to the offer.  The two sides agreed to hold another round of
talks in a third country in October, with a goal of establishing diplomatic ties by the end
of 2000.  The negotiators also agreed to expand bilateral contacts to include politicians
and business enterprises, and to set up committees to handle two of North Korea’s
demands:  the return of cultural treasures taken from Korea during the Japanese
occupation, and improving the legal status of Koreans living in Japan.  Reportedly, North
Korea asked Japan to resume trade insurance and full-scale economic aid, but Japanese
negotiators declined.
The 11th Round (October 2000).  Almost no progress was achieved during the
October 30-November 1, 2000 bilateral meetings in Beijing.  Reportedly, North Korea
flatly rejected Japan’s proposal to offer economic assistance in lieu of compensation.
Japan again turned down North Korea’s demand that the abduction issue be discussed
outside the normalization talks.  A sign of the deadlock is that the two sides did not set a
date for the next round of talks.  
Japan’s 1965 Economic Aid Package to South Korea
On June 22, 1965, Japan and South Korea signed a Treaty of Basic Relations,
normalizing relations between the two countries for the first time since Japan annexed the
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Korean peninsula in 1910.  As part of the final settlement, Japan agreed to provide South
Korea with a total sum of $800 million13, which consisted of: a) an outright grant of $300
million, to be distributed over a 10-year period; b) a $200 million loan to be distributed
over a 10-year period and repaid over 20 years at 3.5% interest; c) $300 million in private
credits over 10 years from Japanese banks and financial institutions. 
Prior to the 1965 agreement, the normalization negotiations between Tokyo and
Seoul had dragged on for over fourteen years, and had triggered strong emotions in both
countries. Throughout the 1950s, South Korean President Syngman Rhee adopted a
confrontational approach toward Japan, and successive Japanese governments showed
little enthusiasm for accepting Rhee’s demands that Japan apologize and compensate for
its colonization of the Korean peninsula. 
Relations warmed dramatically following a military coup in 1961, led by general Park
Chung-Hee, who established rapid industrialization – following the Japanese model of
export-led development – as his country’s paramount economic goal.  To this end, Park
was eager for Japanese economic assistance, and adopted conciliatory postures on most
outstanding issues.  The approximate size and composition of the compensation package
was one of the first issues to be resolved following Park’s coup.  The South Korean side,
which at one point had asked for as much as $2 billion, lowered its demands to $700
million in grant aid before agreeing to the $800 million total package.  Reportedly, until
late 1962, Japan had offered only $70 million in total compensation, a figure the U.S. State
Department at the time described as “unrealistically low.”14  Furthermore, the Treaty on
Basic Relations did not contain any reference to a Japanese apology.  Instead, Japan’s
reparations payment was characterized as “economic assistance.”   
The terms of the Treaty enraged many South Koreans.  Charging that the agreement
amounted to a “sellout,” Korea’s opposition parties boycotted the ratification process in
the National Assembly. Violent anti-government protests erupted throughout the country,
and the Park government imposed martial law to suppress anti-government protests
around the country, the second time in less than a year troops were mobilized to curtail
protests against the government’s Japan policy.  The agreement also faced strong but
eventually ineffectual opposition in Japan, where the Socialist Party – which had friendly
ties with North Korea – argued that the Treaty would impede Korean unification and was
a prelude to an anti-communist alliance in Asia.15 
Estimating the Present Value of the 1965 Settlement
There are a wide range of estimates for the present value of the 1965 Japan-South
Korea settlement.  At the low end is a method that adjusts for inflation in the U.S.
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economy, yielding a value of approximately $3.4 billion in 1999 dollars.16 At the high end
is a calculation that produces a value of $20 billion in today’s dollars by adjusting for
inflation in the Japanese economy, appreciation of the yen, accrued interest, and
differences in population in North and South Korea.17  One methodology that adjusts for
Japanese inflation since 1965 and for inter-Korean population differences yields a present
value of ¥418 billion ($3.8 billion using an exchange rate of ¥110 = $1).  If the same
disbursement formula used in 1965 were applied today, the ¥418 billion would break out
as ¥157 billion ($1.42 billion) in outright grants, ¥104 billion ($950 million) in
concessionary government loans, and ¥157  billion ($1.42 billion) in private credits.18
The above figures should be interpreted as rough approximations.  Computing the
present value of a past sum is an inherently inexact task.  When more than one country is
involved, the calculation is made even less precise by long-term changes and short-term
fluctuations in exchange rates.  Additionally, an exact calculation would take into account
differences between North Korea and South Korea, including the extent of the claims for
damage by the Japanese occupation.  Finally, the adjustments are made for the total figure
of $800 million, even though the actual value of Japan’s compensation package was lower:
Over 60% ($500 million) of the settlement was disbursed as government loans and private
credits, which are less valuable to the recipient than outright grants.  Thus, the calculations
presented, although providing a preliminary comparative baseline, tend to overstate the
present value of Japan’s settlement with South Korea.  
On the other hand, the 1965 settlement occurred before the revelation that Japan had
forcibly used tens of thousands of Korean “comfort women” to provide sexual services to
Japanese soldiers during World War II.  North Korea is insisting that Japan’s
compensation take into account the comfort women’s plight, a demand that (if it is met)
presumably would raise the value of the settlement package.19
